Perturbation-based Techniques for Explaining Sequence Predictions

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Content

- **Limitations and Optimizations of Existing Perturbations**
- **Introduce Information Theory in Perturbations**
- **How to Apply Perturbations with Information Bottleneck**

Explaining Time Series via Contrastive and Locally Sparse Perturbations

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Background

Black-box models with post-hoc explanation techniques: ***Find salient features*!**





Visual Explanation

Source: [Fong et al.]



Graph Explanation

Source: [Miao et al.]



Game Explanation

Source: [Liu et al.]

Challenges for Explaining Time Series



Dynamask, Crabbe´ et al.

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

- **Fail to interpret visually**
  - Dense salient features (unlike the image and text)
  - Noisy samples in time series
- **Hard find temporal pattenrns**
  - The time series is smoothed
- **Perturbations matter**
  - Setting a more uninformative values is important
  - Give only instance-based explanations

Existing Perturbations are Inadequate

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

where
$$u = \begin{cases} 0 \\ \frac{1}{w+1} \sum_{t-w}^{t} x_i \\ \text{Gaussian blur} \\ \text{NN}(x) \\ \dots \end{cases}$$

- Those perturbations may ***out of distribution*** or ***label leakage***
- Cannot relate temporal patterns ***across samples***



Illustrating different styles of perturbation. Other perturbations could be either not uninformative or not in-domain, while ours is counterfactual that is toward the distribution of negative samples.

ContraLSP Architecture



Perturbation: $\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \varphi_{cntr}(x)$

How to learn the ***uninformative*** $\varphi_{cntr}(x)$ and ***sparse mask m***?

Two Main Contributions (1)

- **Learning counterfactuals from contrastive loss**

  - Step1: Find positive and negative samples

$$\left(\boldsymbol{x}_i^r, \{\boldsymbol{x}_{i,k}^{r^+}\}_{k=1}^{K^+}, \{\boldsymbol{x}_{i,k}^{r^-}\}_{k=1}^{K^-}\right)$$

Where $\begin{cases} \mathcal{D}_{an} = \frac{1}{K^-}\sum_{k=1}^{K^-} |\boldsymbol{x}_i^r - \boldsymbol{x}_{i,k}^{r^-}| \\ \mathcal{D}_{ap} = \frac{1}{K^+}\sum_{k=1}^{K^+} |\boldsymbol{x}_i^r - \boldsymbol{x}_{i,k}^{r^+}| \end{cases}$



Learning counterfactuals

  - Step2: Optimizing via Manhattan distance

$$\mathcal{L}_{cntr}(\boldsymbol{x}_i) = \max(0, \mathcal{D}_{an} - \mathcal{D}_{ap} - b) + \|\boldsymbol{x}_i^r\|_1 \,,$$

Two Main Contributions (2)

➢ **Learning sparse gates with smooth constraint**



If not smooth, predictor f may error!

- Sparse gates:

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}_i' = \boldsymbol{\mu}_i \odot \sigma(\tau_{\theta_2}(\boldsymbol{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i) = \frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}{1 + e^{-\tau_{\theta_2}(\boldsymbol{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}},$$

- L_0-regularization:

$$\mathcal{R}(\boldsymbol{x}_i, \boldsymbol{m}_i) = \|\boldsymbol{m}_i\|_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{T}\sum_{d=1}^{D}\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\operatorname{erf}\left(\frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}_i'[t,d]}{\sqrt{2}\delta}\right)\right),$$



Binary-skewed masks

Synthetic Experiments (with label)

1. White-box Regression

Table 1: Performance on Rare-Time and Rare-Observation experiments w/o different groups.

Method	Rare-Time AUP ↑	AUR ↑	$I_m/10^4$ ↑	$S_m/10^2$ ↓	Rare-Time (Diffgroups) AUP ↑	AUR ↑	$I_m/10^4$ ↑	$S_m/10^2$ ↓
FO	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.46$_{\pm0.01}$	47.20$_{\pm0.61}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.16$_{\pm0.00}$	0.53$_{\pm0.01}$	54.89$_{\pm0.70}$
AFO	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.15$_{\pm0.01}$	0.51$_{\pm0.01}$	55.60$_{\pm0.85}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.16$_{\pm0.00}$	0.54$_{\pm0.01}$	57.76$_{\pm0.72}$
IG	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.46$_{\pm0.01}$	47.61$_{\pm0.62}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.15$_{\pm0.00}$	0.53$_{\pm0.01}$	54.62$_{\pm0.85}$
SVS	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.47$_{\pm0.01}$	47.20$_{\pm0.61}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.15$_{\pm0.00}$	0.52$_{\pm0.02}$	54.28$_{\pm0.84}$
Dynamask	0.99$_{\pm0.01}$	0.67$_{\pm0.02}$	8.68$_{\pm0.11}$	37.24$_{\pm0.48}$	0.99$_{\pm0.01}$	0.51$_{\pm0.00}$	5.75$_{\pm0.13}$	47.33$_{\pm1.02}$
Extrmask	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.88$_{\pm0.00}$	16.40$_{\pm0.13}$	13.10$_{\pm0.78}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.83$_{\pm0.03}$	13.37$_{\pm0.78}$	27.44$_{\pm3.68}$
ContraLSP	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	**0.97**$_{\pm0.01}$	**19.51**$_{\pm0.30}$	**4.65**$_{\pm0.71}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	**0.94**$_{\pm0.01}$	**18.92**$_{\pm0.37}$	**4.40**$_{\pm0.60}$
Method	**Rare-Observation AUP ↑**	**AUR ↑**	**$I_m/10^4$ ↑**	**$S_m/10^2$ ↓**	**Rare-Observation (Diffgroups) AUP ↑**	**AUR ↑**	**$I_m/10^4$ ↑**	**$S_m/10^2$ ↓**
FO	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.46$_{\pm0.00}$	47.39$_{\pm0.16}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.14$_{\pm0.00}$	0.50$_{\pm0.01}$	52.13$_{\pm0.96}$
AFO	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.16$_{\pm0.00}$	0.55$_{\pm0.01}$	56.81$_{\pm0.39}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.16$_{\pm0.01}$	0.54$_{\pm0.02}$	56.92$_{\pm1.24}$
IG	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.46$_{\pm0.00}$	47.82$_{\pm0.15}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.47$_{\pm0.00}$	49.90$_{\pm0.88}$
SVS	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.46$_{\pm0.00}$	47.39$_{\pm0.16}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.13$_{\pm0.00}$	0.47$_{\pm0.01}$	49.53$_{\pm0.84}$
Dynamask	0.97$_{\pm0.00}$	0.65$_{\pm0.00}$	8.32$_{\pm0.06}$	22.87$_{\pm0.58}$	0.98$_{\pm0.00}$	0.52$_{\pm0.01}$	6.12$_{\pm0.10}$	30.88$_{\pm0.70}$
Extrmask	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.76$_{\pm0.00}$	13.25$_{\pm0.07}$	9.55$_{\pm0.39}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	0.70$_{\pm0.04}$	10.40$_{\pm0.54}$	32.81$_{\pm0.88}$
ContraLSP	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	**20.68**$_{\pm0.03}$	**0.32**$_{\pm0.16}$	**1.00**$_{\pm0.00}$	**0.99**$_{\pm0.00}$	**20.51**$_{\pm0.07}$	**0.57**$_{\pm0.20}$

2. Black-box Classification

Table 2: Performance on Switch Feature and State data.

Method	Switch-Feature AUP ↑	AUR ↑	$I_m/10^4$ ↑	$S_m/10^3$ ↓	State AUP ↑	AUR ↑	$I_m/10^4$ ↑	$S_m/10^3$ ↓
FO	0.89$_{\pm0.03}$	0.37$_{\pm0.02}$	1.86$_{\pm0.14}$	15.60$_{\pm0.28}$	0.90$_{\pm0.05}$	0.30$_{\pm0.01}$	2.73$_{\pm0.15}$	28.07$_{\pm0.54}$
AFO	0.82$_{\pm0.06}$	0.41$_{\pm0.02}$	2.00$_{\pm0.14}$	17.32$_{\pm0.29}$	0.84$_{\pm0.08}$	0.36$_{\pm0.03}$	3.16$_{\pm0.27}$	34.03$_{\pm1.10}$
IG	0.91$_{\pm0.02}$	0.44$_{\pm0.03}$	2.21$_{\pm0.17}$	16.87$_{\pm0.52}$	0.93$_{\pm0.02}$	0.34$_{\pm0.03}$	3.17$_{\pm0.28}$	30.19$_{\pm1.22}$
GradShap	0.88$_{\pm0.02}$	0.38$_{\pm0.02}$	1.92$_{\pm0.13}$	15.85$_{\pm0.40}$	0.88$_{\pm0.06}$	0.30$_{\pm0.02}$	2.76$_{\pm0.20}$	28.18$_{\pm0.96}$
DeepLift	0.91$_{\pm0.02}$	0.44$_{\pm0.02}$	2.23$_{\pm0.16}$	16.86$_{\pm0.52}$	0.93$_{\pm0.02}$	0.35$_{\pm0.03}$	3.20$_{\pm0.27}$	30.21$_{\pm1.19}$
LIME	0.94$_{\pm0.02}$	0.40$_{\pm0.02}$	2.01$_{\pm0.13}$	16.09$_{\pm0.58}$	**0.95**$_{\pm0.02}$	0.32$_{\pm0.03}$	2.94$_{\pm0.26}$	28.55$_{\pm1.53}$
FIT	0.48$_{\pm0.03}$	0.43$_{\pm0.02}$	1.99$_{\pm0.11}$	17.16$_{\pm0.50}$	0.45$_{\pm0.02}$	0.59$_{\pm0.02}$	7.92$_{\pm0.40}$	33.59$_{\pm0.17}$
Retain	0.93$_{\pm0.01}$	0.33$_{\pm0.04}$	1.54$_{\pm0.20}$	15.08$_{\pm1.13}$	0.52$_{\pm0.16}$	0.21$_{\pm0.02}$	1.56$_{\pm0.24}$	25.01$_{\pm0.57}$
Dynamask	0.35$_{\pm0.00}$	0.77$_{\pm0.02}$	5.22$_{\pm0.26}$	12.85$_{\pm0.53}$	0.36$_{\pm0.01}$	0.79$_{\pm0.01}$	10.59$_{\pm0.20}$	25.11$_{\pm0.40}$
Extrmask	0.97$_{\pm0.01}$	0.65$_{\pm0.05}$	8.45$_{\pm0.51}$	6.90$_{\pm1.44}$	0.87$_{\pm0.01}$	0.77$_{\pm0.01}$	29.71$_{\pm1.39}$	7.54$_{\pm0.46}$
ContraLSP	**0.98**$_{\pm0.00}$	**0.80**$_{\pm0.03}$	**24.23**$_{\pm1.27}$	**0.91**$_{\pm0.26}$	0.90$_{\pm0.03}$	**0.81**$_{\pm0.01}$	**50.09**$_{\pm0.78}$	**0.50**$_{\pm0.05}$



Synthetic Experiments (with label)

- Counterfactual information



- Distribution analysis of perturbations

Table 12: Difference between the distribution of different perturbations and the original distribution.

Perturbation type	Rare-Time KDE-score ↑	Rare-Time KL-divergence ↓	Rare-Observation KDE-score ↑	Rare-Observation KL-divergence ↓
Zero perturbation	−25.242	0.0523	−23.377	0.0421
Mean perturbation	−30.805	0.0731	−26.421	0.0589
Extrmask perturbation	−22.532	0.0219	−19.102	0.0104
ContraLSP perturbation	−23.290	0.0393	−22.732	0.0386

Real-world Experiments (without label)

3. MIMIC-III Mortality Data





Learning Time-Series Explanations with Information Bottleneck

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Existing Perturbation Time Series

Perturbation: $$\Phi(x,m) = x \times m + (1-m) \times \mu$$

Goal: ***find a mask m*!**

1. Explaining the black box directly



$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x,m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

2. Approximating the black box through a white box



$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}\big(f(x), f^E \circ \Phi(x,m)\big)}_{\text{label consistency}}$$
$$+ \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{B}(f, f^E)}_{\text{behavior}}$$

Challenges for Perturbing Time Series

Perturbation: $\Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$

1. Explaining the black box directly

   - Instance out-of-distribution
   - Perturb function is fixed

2. Learning a white box

   - Embeddings distribution shift
   - Consistent behaviour is not equal to consistent explanation
   - Need to know the model structure



Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

Objective:

$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

$$\arg\max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

Objective:

$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

Signaling Problem!

Compactness Problem!

$$\arg\max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

$$M[t,d] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (t,d) = \arg\max_{t',d'} X[t',d'] \text{ and } Y = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } (t,d) = \arg\min_{t',d'} X[t',d'] \text{ and } Y = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} .$$

$$X_i = \begin{cases} U_i, & \text{if } i < n \\ U_1 + U_2 + \cdots + U_i + N_i & \text{if } i \geq n \end{cases},$$

Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

Objective:

$$\arg\min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x,m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

$$\arg\max I(Y;X') - I(X;X')$$

$$\min_{\substack{g:\mathcal{X}\mapsto[0,1]^{T\times D}\\ M[t,d]\sim\mathrm{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\mathrm{LC}(Y;Y') + \mathbb{E}_X[\alpha \sum_{t,d} H(M[t,d]) + \gamma|M||],$$

deterministic regular

Traceable Information Bottleneck

Objective: $\arg\min -\mathrm{LC}(Y;Y') + I(X;X')$

- Modify the Compactness Quantifier I(X; X′)

$$\min_{\substack{g:\mathcal{X}\mapsto[0,1]^{T\times D}\\ M[t,d]\sim\mathrm{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\mathrm{LC}(Y;Y')+\mathbb{E}_X[\alpha\sum_{t,d}H(M[t,d])+\gamma|M|],$$

Reformulated as:

$$\begin{aligned}\min_{\substack{g:\mathcal{X}\mapsto[0,1]^{T\times D}\\ M[t,d]\sim\mathrm{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} \quad & -\mathrm{LC}(Y;Y') \\ & +\alpha\mathbb{E}_X\left[D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\mathbb{P}(M|X)\|\mathbb{Q}(M))\right],\end{aligned}$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck

Objective: $\arg\min -\mathrm{LC}(Y;Y') + I(X;X')$

- The Informativeness Quantifier LC(Y; Y′)

Previous perturbation: $X^r = \Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$

Our perturbation: $\widetilde{X} = \Psi(X, M)$

$$-\mathrm{LC}(f(X), f(\widetilde{X})), s.t. \mathbb{P}_X \approx \mathbb{P}_{\widetilde{X}}, P(Y'|\widetilde{X}) \approx P(Y'|X')$$

Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{LC}}(f(X), f(\widetilde{X})) + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{KL}}(\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{X}}, \mathbb{P}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}}) + \mathcal{L}_{dr}(\widetilde{X}, \widetilde{X}^r)).$$

TimeX++ Architecture



$$\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{LC}} + \alpha\mathcal{L}_M + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{KL}} + \mathcal{L}_{dr}),$$

label consistency, regular, in-distribution, uninformative

Learn Highly-Faithful Explaniations

Table 1. Attribution explanation performance on univariate and multivariate synthetic datasets.

Method	FreqShapes AUPRC	FreqShapes AUP	FreqShapes AUR	SeqComb-UV AUPRC	SeqComb-UV AUP	SeqComb-UV AUR
IG	0.7516±0.0032	0.6912±0.0028	0.5975±0.0020	0.5760±0.0022	0.8157±0.0023	0.2868±0.0023
Dynamask	0.2201±0.0013	0.2952±0.0037	0.5037±0.0015	0.4421±0.0016	0.8782±0.0039	0.1029±0.0007
WinIT	0.5071±0.0021	0.5546±0.0026	0.4557±0.0016	0.4568±0.0017	0.7872±0.0027	0.2253±0.0016
CoRTX	0.6978±0.0156	0.4938±0.0004	0.3261±0.0012	0.5643±0.0024	0.8241±0.0025	0.1749±0.0007
SGT + Grad	0.5312±0.0019	0.4138±0.0011	0.3931±0.0015	0.5731±0.0021	0.7828±0.0013	0.2136±0.0008
TimeX	0.8324±0.0034	0.7219±0.0031	0.6381±0.0022	0.7124±0.0017	**0.9411**±0.0006	0.3380±0.0014
TimeX++	**0.8905**±0.0018	**0.7805**±0.0014	**0.6618**±0.0019	**0.8468**±0.0014	0.9069±0.0003	**0.4064**±0.0011

Method	SeqComb-MV AUPRC	SeqComb-MV AUP	SeqComb-MV AUR	LowVar AUPRC	LowVar AUP	LowVar AUR
IG	0.3298±0.0015	0.7483±0.0027	0.2581±0.0028	0.8691±0.0035	0.4827±0.0029	0.8165±0.0016
Dynamask	0.3136±0.0019	0.5481±0.0053	0.1953±0.0025	0.1391±0.0012	0.1640±0.0028	0.2106±0.0018
WinIT	0.2809±0.0018	0.7594±0.0024	0.2077±0.0021	0.1667±0.0015	0.1140±0.0022	0.3842±0.0017
CoRTX	0.3629±0.0021	0.5625±0.0006	0.3457±0.0017	0.4983±0.0014	0.3281±0.0027	0.4711±0.0013
SGT + Grad	0.4893±0.0005	0.4970±0.0005	**0.4289**±0.0018	0.3449±0.0010	0.2133±0.0029	0.3528±0.0015
TimeX	0.6878±0.0021	0.8326±0.0008	0.3872±0.0015	0.8673±0.0033	0.5451±0.0028	**0.9004**±0.0024
TimeX++	**0.7589**±0.0014	**0.8783**±0.0007	0.3906±0.0011	**0.9466**±0.0015	**0.8057**±0.0016	0.8332±0.0016

Table 3. (*Left*) Attribution explanation performance on the ECG dataset. (*Right*) Results of ablation analysis.

Method	ECG AUPRC	ECG AUP	ECG AUR
IG	0.4182±0.0014	0.5949±0.0023	0.3204±0.0012
Dynamask	0.3280±0.0011	0.5249±0.0030	0.1082±0.0080
WinIT	0.3049±0.0011	0.4431±0.0026	0.3474±0.0011
CoRTX	0.3735±0.0008	0.4968±0.0021	0.3031±0.0009
SGT + Grad	0.3144±0.0010	0.4241±0.0024	0.2639±0.0013
TimeX	0.4721±0.0018	0.5663±0.0025	0.4457±0.0018
TimeX++	**0.6599**±0.0009	**0.7260**±0.0010	**0.4595**±0.0007

TimeX++ Ablations	ECG AUPRC	ECG AUP	ECG AUR
Full	**0.6599**±0.0009	0.7260±0.0010	0.4595±0.0007
w/o STE	0.6152±0.0007	**0.7468**±0.0008	0.4023±0.0012
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{LC}}$	0.6209±0.0019	0.6417±0.0020	0.4287±0.0015
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{KL}}$	0.6417±0.0019	0.6979±0.0009	0.4424±0.0007
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{dr}$	0.1516±0.0003	0.1405±0.0003	**0.6313**±0.0006
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{con}}$	0.6072±0.0008	0.6921±0.0010	0.4387±0.0007

Explaniations on Real-world Datasets



Figure 3. Occlusion experiments on real-world datasets. Higher values indicate better performance.





Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck

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Background

- Jailbreaking with adversarial prompts



- Different forms of adversarial prompts



Motivation

How do you defend against these attacks? **Perturbation!**



Smooth and RA LLM
Source: Robey et al. and Cao et al.



Existing Methods are Inadequate

Table 3: Comparison between our IBProtector and other defense methodologies.

Method	Finetuning	Filter	Support Ensemble	Information Extraction	Transferability	Support Black-box	Inference Cost
Fine-tuning	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Unlearning LLM	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Self Defense	✗	–	No	✔	✗	Yes	High
Smooth LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
RA-LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
Semantic Smooth	✗	✔	Yes	✔	–	Yes	High
IBProtector	✔	✔	Yes	✔	✔	Yes	Low

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} := \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha\, \underbrace{I(X; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$$

where, $I(Y; X_{\text{sub}}) = H(Y) - H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

where, $X_{\text{sub}} = X \odot M$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier I(X; Xsub)

$$I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) \leq \mathbb{E}_X \left[D_{\text{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\text{sub}}|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(X_{\text{sub}})] \right],$$

Give $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi :$ $\quad p_\phi(X_{\leq t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$$M \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi(M|X) = \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(\pi_t) \quad \text{Define } \mathbb{Q}(M) \sim \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(r)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1 - \pi_t) \log(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}) \right]$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier I(X; X_{sub})

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1 - \pi_t) \log(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in X_{sub}

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t)^2}$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- The Informativeness Quantifier H(Y| Xsub)

$$H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}) = -\sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} = \underbrace{-\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\text{KL}}\left[f_{\text{tar}}(\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t}) || f_{\text{tar}}(X, Y_{<t})\right]}_{\text{RLHF}}$$

Information Bottleneck Protector

- The framework of IBProtector



$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})$$

informative, regular, connective

Further Gradient-Free Version

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\max_{\phi}\ \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\rho(Y;\hat{Y})] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[p_{\phi}(X)||p_{\phi}^{\text{ref}}(X)]}_{\text{RL for Prediction}} - \underbrace{\alpha(\mathcal{L}_{M} + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})}_{\text{Compactness}},$$

where, $$\rho(Y;\hat{Y}) = -\frac{\gamma(Y)\cdot\gamma(\hat{Y})}{\|\gamma(Y)\|^{2}\|\gamma(\hat{Y})\|^{2}}$$

Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Table 1: Defense results of state-of-the-art methods and IBProtector on AdvBench.

Experiment		**Prompt-level Jailbreak** (PAIR)			**Token-level Jailbreak** (GCG)			TriviaQA
Model	Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	BAR ↑
Vicuna (13b-v1.5)	Original Attack	87.5%	4.034	3.008	82.5%	0.244	4.300	97.8%
	Fine-tuning	62.5%	2.854	2.457	32.5%	0.089	2.114	94.8%
	Unlearning LLM	66.7%	2.928	2.496	40.8%	0.123	2.537	92.2%
	Self Defense	44.2%	2.585	1.692	12.5%	-1.170	1.400	79.6%
	Smooth LLM	68.3%	3.115	2.642	24.2%	<u>-1.252</u>	1.767	90.9%
	RA-LLM	34.2%	2.446	1.832	<u>8.3%</u>	-1.133	1.411	95.2%
	Semantic Smooth	<u>20.0%</u>	<u>2.170</u>	<u>1.525</u>	**1.7%**	-0.842	<u>1.058</u>	<u>95.7%</u>
	IBProtector	**19.2%**	**1.971**	**1.483**	**1.7%**	**-1.763**	**1.042**	**96.5%**
LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)	Original Attack	67.5%	3.852	1.617	27.5%	0.325	2.517	98.7%
	Fine-tuning	47.5%	2.551	1.392	12.5%	-0.024	1.233	<u>97.0%</u>
	Unlearning LLM	49.2%	2.507	1.383	12.5%	-0.084	1.258	**97.4%**
	Self Defense	45.0%	2.682	1.525	11.7%	0.208	1.492	92.6%
	Smooth LLM	43.3%	2.394	1.342	<u>4.2%</u>	0.189	<u>1.100</u>	95.2%
	RA-LLM	<u>40.0%</u>	2.493	1.362	<u>4.2%</u>	-0.070	1.116	<u>97.0%</u>
	Semantic Smooth	40.8%	<u>2.250</u>	<u>1.333</u>	10.0%	<u>-0.141</u>	1.417	96.5%
	IBProtector	**16.7%**	**1.315**	**1.125**	**0.8%**	**-1.024**	**1.000**	<u>97.0%</u>

Transferability Experiments

- Defend against other attack methods:

Method	Vicuna (13b-v1.5) ASR ↓	Vicuna Harm ↓	Vicuna GPT-4 ↓	LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf) ASR ↓	LLaMA-2 Harm ↓	LLaMA-2 GPT-4 ↓
Original Attack	88.6%	2.337	4.225	29.0%	2.167	1.883
Fine-tuning	26.8%	1.124	1.772	5.1%	1.597	1.192
Unlearning LLM	28.3%	1.127	1.815	5.1%	1.534	1.233
Self Defense	28.7%	1.291	**1.725**	8.7%	1.439	1.792
Smooth LLM	81.1%	1.673	2.168	35.5%	1.720	1.992
RA-LLM	54.1%	1.027	1.892	2.2%	1.484	1.253
Semantic Smooth	49.2%	0.417	2.022	5.1%	1.116	1.101
IBProtector	**18.9%**	**0.031**	1.854	**0.7%**	**0.608**	**1.036**

- Protect other target models:



Low Computational Cost

Table 7: Theoretical costs of the inference phase of existing defense methods.

Method	Theoretical Cost	Simplify
Original Attack	$C_{\text{ori}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	C_{ori}
Fine-tuning	$C_{\text{sft}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Unlearning LLM	$C_{\text{unlearning}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Self Defense	$C_{\text{self def}} = C_{\text{ori}} + (\lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}'\rvert \times c_Y)$	$\approx 2 \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Smooth LLM	$C_{\text{smooth}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
RA-LLM	$C_{\text{ra}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Semantic Smooth	$C_{\text{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx 2n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
IBProtector	$T \times c_p + (1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$

Method	PAIR → Vicuna	GCG → Vicuna	PAIR → LLaMA-2	GCG → LLaMA-2	Avg. Time
Original Attack	4.962±0.828	5.067±0.841	4.235±0.217	4.095±0.312	4.590
Fine-tuning	4.850±1.380	4.726±0.911	4.107±0.154	3.873±0.309	4.389
Unlearning LLM	5.014±0.781	5.128±0.643	4.233±0.373	4.042±0.643	4.604
Self Defense	9.551±1.843	8.413±1.438	8.780±1.224	9.208±0.988	8.988
Smooth LLM(one copy)	5.297±0.717	5.015±1.398	4.284±0.180	4.319±0.392	4.729
RA-LLM(one copy)	5.664±1.268	5.351±1.550	4.269±0.643	4.528±0.475	4.953
IBProtector	5.509±1.283	5.370±1.489	4.426±1.137	4.251±1.367	4.889

Conclusion

- We investigate the limitations of existing explanation models in terms of sequence and give an intuitive solution.
- We further give a perspective of information theory and propose a practical objective function in information bottleneck to slove distribution shifting.
- We apply our perturbation proposal to the defence against adversarial scenarios in large language models, and achieved significant results.
- All codes of three papers are available at https://github.com/zichuan-liu

Future Explorations

- How to represent uncertainty when black box models are inaccurate



- Quantification of compression amplitude and parameter tuning strategy

$$\widetilde{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{LC}} + \alpha\mathcal{L}_{M} + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{KL}} + \mathcal{L}_{dr}),$$

Thanks for your listening!

Any Questions? Please use the chat !